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NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco: Continued
Support for the Universality of Trademarks
The world's largest free market, the United States, is flooded
with an amazing array of domestic and foreign goods. Because of
this, the use of trademarks to identify and differentiate products has
become a cornerstone of marketing in this country.' But the exact
nature and functions of trademarks as well as the protections af-
forded to owners are often blurry.2 Nowhere is this more true than
with grey market goods which are "goods manufactured abroad [and
later brought into the United States] bearing legitimate foreign
trademarks that are identical to American trademarks."'
Domestic trademark owners of foreign-produced goods oppose
grey market imports. They claim that purchasers of grey market
goods may be deprived of necessary warranties and product liability
protection. 4 Consumers may also receive inferior quality goods such
as instruction manuals written in a foreign language. 5 In addition,
domestic trademark owners feel compelled to service goods they did
not sell to avoid hurting the trademark's reputation. Finally, trade-
mark owners believe the marketer in grey goods free-rides on the
sales and promotional efforts of the mark holder.6
I See generally J. MURPHY, BRANDING: A KEY MARKETING TOOL (1987).
2 Donohue, The Use of Copyright Laws To Prevent the Importation of "Genuine Goods, " 11
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 188 (1986).
3 Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United States, 790
F.2d 903, 904 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986).
This situation typically arises when a foreign producer creates an American
subsidiary that then registers the American trademark. Both the foreign pro-
ducer and its American subsidiary often wish distribution in the United
States to be exclusively controlled by the American subsidiary. If, however,
the price at which the American subsidiary sells the goods exceeds the price
at which the goods are sold abroad, other importers have an obvious incen-
tive to purchase the goods abroad (typically from a third-party who has legiti-
mately purchased directly from the foreign producer) and resell them in the
United States- perhaps without certain associated services or warranties-at
a price below that charged by the American subsidiary. The same result can
occur, however, if the American trademark owner is the parent and the goods
are manufactured abroad by a foreign subsidiary.
Id.
4 Fitzpatrick & Brunet, Barring Importation of Gray Goods Under Section 42 of the Lanham
Act, and Section 526 of the Taif Act, in GRAY MARKETS AND PARALLEL IMPORTATION: PROTEC-
TIONISM vs. FREE TRADE 9 (1986).
5 Id. at 11. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs. Inc., 816
F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1987).
6 Fitzpatrick & Brunet, supra note 4, at 11-12.
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Parallel importers7 insist that trademark law is designed to pro-
tect against goods manufactured by others than the trademark owner
and falsely labelled as coming from that owner. The law is not, ac-
cording to these importers, intended to ban genuine goods from the
market.8 To do so would deprive the public of price competition
and the lower prices found in foreign markets.9 At-the center of this
controversy is the question of protectionism versus free trade.
Should the government permit the free flow of trademarked goods
into the U.S. or protect the interests of domestic trademark owners?
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with this issue in NEC Elec-
tronics v. CAL Circuit Abco. l0
Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC) is a worldwide manufac-
turer of electronic components and systems headquartered in Japan.
One of this company's most substantial businesses is the sale of inte-
grated circuits, particularly in the United States. NEC-USA is a
wholly owned subsidary of NEC and is primarily controlled by that
parent corporation. NEC-USA manufactures some integrated cir-
cuits for sale in the United States but roughly ninety percent are im-
ported from its parent company's foreign manufacturing sites. NEC-
USA has been assigned the trademark "NEC" in this country by the
parent company but NEC-Japan continues to market its products
outside the United States under this mark.'I
CAL Circuit Abco buys these NEC-marked chips at low prices in
foreign markets and imports them into this country. Abco resells the
chips as genuine NEC components at substantially higher domestic
prices in direct competition with NEC-USA. The parts are identical
to those sold by NEC-USA.' 2
NEC-USA sued CAL Circuit Abco for trademark infringement
7 The term "parallel importers" is a shorthand term used to encompass all
parties involved in the chain of commerce ultimately resulting in the domes-
tic sale of genuine imported trademarked goods by independent companies.
The term includes buyers, importers, wholesalers and retailers of such
goods, when the goods have not been obtained directly from "authorized"
United States dealers. The purchase, importation and sale of such goods is
said to be "parallel" to the channels "authorized" by the international trade-
mark owners.
Gorelick & Little, The Case for Parallel Importation, II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 205
n.1 (1986).
Opponents like to refer to this system as the "grey market," with its innu-
endo of impropriety or borderline legality. There is, however, nothing un-
derhanded about the business practice at issue. The goods are the authentic
trademarked item, purchased openly on the open market. The goods are
declared, customs duties are paid, and the products are sold in the United
States by reputable, well-established domestic retailers.
Id. at 207 n.5.
8 Granada Ekcs., 816 F.2d at 72.
9 Fitzpatrick & Brunet, supra note 4, at 12.
10 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987) (appeal pending).
II Id. at 1507-08.
12 Id.
[VOL. 13
1988] NEC ELECTRONICS V. CAL CIRCUIT ABCO 375
under sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act 13 alleging that consum-
ers were purchasing Abco's products in the belief that the company
was connected with, controlled by, or authorized by NEC-USA. Evi-
dence was presented and the trial court found that some customers
mistakenly thought their purchases from Abco were protected by
NEC-USA warranties and servicing policies. Because NEC-USA
showed damage to its reputation due to this confusion, the district
court granted NEC-USA partial summary judgment and a prelimi-
nary injunction against further sales.' 4
On appeal the Ninth Circuit ruled that a wholly owned U.S. sub-
sidiary of a foreign corporation that sells certain goods in this coun-
try cannot sue under trademark law if another company buys the
parent's identical goods and then sells them here using the parent's
true mark. 15 The appellate court reversed the lower court's ruling,
vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings on the remaining claims. 16
The appellate court based its opinion on three legal theories:
the universality principle, the trade identity theory, and the exhaus-
tion doctrine.17 The universality principle states that "a trademark is
valid if it correctly identifies the origin of the good to which it is
13 Section 32 of the Lanham Act reads in part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imita-
tion of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distri-
bution, or advertising of any. goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and
apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to
be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinaf-
ter provided.
Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 32(1), 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
(1982)). Section 43 of the Lanham Act provides in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply or annex, or use in connection with any
goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or repre-
sent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce, and any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or procure the
same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any car-
rier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person
doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the re-
gion in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43, 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1982)).
14 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1508.
15 Id. at 1508-09.
16 Id. at 1511.
17 Id. at 1509.
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attached, regardless of where the good is sold."' 18
The trade identity theory, a corollary to the universality princi-
ple, asserts that "trademark law is designed to prevent sellers from
confusing or deceiving consumers about the origin or make of a
product . . ."19 and, therefore, "[t]rademark law generally does not
reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark. ."20 because
"confusion [as to the origin or source of the good] ordinarily does
not exist when a genuine article bearing a true mark is sold." 2'
The exhaustion doctrine holds that "[o]nce a trademark owner
sells his product, the buyer ordinarily may resell the product under
the original mark without incurring any trademark law liability. ' 22
The court believed that these principles alone would normally
govern this case. 23 First, it was uncontested that the chips distrib-
uted in the United States by Abco had true NEC trademarks which
correctly identified their origin as required under the universality
principle. 24 Second, although consumers were confused about the
warranties available with their purchases, they were not confused
about the origin or maker of the products. 25 Since this was the only
form of confusion recognized under the trade identity theory, NEC
could not sue under trademark law. Third, CAL Circuit Abco legiti-
mately purchased the components from a middleman to whom NEC
18 Mackintosh & Graham, Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy, 11
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 293, 297-98 (1986).
19 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509. The Court cited Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359,
368-69 (1924); Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1983). See also 3A R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
21.-17, at 76 (L. Altman 4th ed. 1983); 2 S. LADA, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED
RIGHTS 732, at 1341 (1975); Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Compar-
ative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REv. 433, 453 (1982).
20 Id. The Court cited Monte Carlo Shirt, 707 F.2d at 1057-58; Diamond Supply Co. v.
Prudential Paper Prods. Co., 589 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
21 Id. More often than not the trade identity theory and the universality principle are
lumped together wholly under the universality principle. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass,
Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 705 (D.NJ. 1985):
[The universality principle] held that merchandise bearing a lawful foreign
trademark could not be deemed an infringing product in another country.
This would be true even when a person in the other country had the exclu-
sive right to use the trademark and distribute the product in that country.
Since the goods are genuine, the public would not be deceived as to their
"source of origin," i.e., the manufacturer.
22 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509. One commentator has stated:
The exhaustion doctrine prohibits a trademark holder from controlling
branded goods after releasing them into the stream of commerce. The
trademark holder's control is deemed exhausted after the first sale of the
goods. After the mark holder exhausts his control, secondary dealers may
advertise and sell the merchandise in competition with the mark holder as
long as they do not represent themselves as authorized agents.
Turner, Grey Market Litigation in the United States District Courts, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM.
REG. 349, 357 (1986).
23 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509.
24 Id. at 1508.
25 Id.
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had sold the goods.2 6 Thus, the exhaustion doctrine applied; NEC
could not control what Abco did with the product anyway.
NEC had argued that a Supreme Court case, A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Katzel 2 7 created a legal theory called the territoriality principle which
replaced the universality principle.2 8 The territoriality principle
holds that "the protection which a trademark receives in a particular
country depends upon the law of that country."2 9
The court believed that Katzel created an exception to the
universality principle rather than an independent doctrine and dis-
tinguished Katzel from Abco in two ways.30 First, the plaintiff in Katzel
made an arms-length, bargained for exchange in acquiring the rights
to its trademark. The intent of this contract was clearly to prohibit
the original manufacturer from selling the trademarked product in
the United States in exchange for which the plaintiff gave considera-
tion.3 t Conversely, NEC-USA was simply an assignee of the NEC
trademark, more of an alter-ego of the parent company than a sepa-
rate entity.3 2
Second, in Katzel the domestic trademark holder gained com-
plete control over and responsibility for the quality of the product.
The plaintiff could have sold a lesser product under the trademark
instead of purchasing the defendant's product or the defendant
could have begun making an inferior product overseas.3 3 In Abco on
the other hand, NEC-USA's parent corporation retained control over
the quality of the product offered in the United States. NEC was able
to assure that all products that were produced were of substantially
equal quality. 34
The court also noted3 5 that the Second Circuit had similarly lim-
ited Katzel to its specific fact pattern in a recent case, Olympus Corp. v.
United States. 36
26 Id. at 1507-08.
27 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), rev g, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
28 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987).
29 According to [the territoriality] principle, the protection which a trademark
receives in a particular country depends upon the law of that country ....
The "territoriality principle" recognizes that a trademark has a separate legal
existence in each country, and that a trademark does not specify the "source
of origin" of the product. Rather, it symbolizes the good will of the domestic
mark holder whose reputation backs the particular product in that territory.
Thus, even if a trademark correctly identified the manufacturer of the goods,
it would still be an infringing product if it deceived the public into believing
that the domestic markholder's good will stood behind the product.
Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 705 (D.N.J. 1985).
30 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509-10. See also Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Corp.,
707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983).
31 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509.
32 Id. at 1507.
33 Id. at 1509.
34 Id. at 1508.
35 Id. at 1510.
36 Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir.) 1986.
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With that, the court held that trademark law did not support the
action which NEC brought. 37 It noted, however, that NEC was not
without recourse. "If, as NEC-USA alleges, Abco sales agents mis-
lead their buyers about the availability of NEC-USA servicing, then
Abco may be liable in contract or tort, but not in trademark. ' 38
There have been many suits brought under sections 32 and 43
of the Lanham Act. 39 As one court stated, "the 'heart of a successful
claim' is a showing of likelihood of confusion .... -40 The key disa-
greement is over the actionable types of confusion.4' Courts agree
that if "an appreciable number of purchasers is likely to be misled as
to the source or sponsorship of defendant's products," 42 there is ad-
equate cause to invoke the protection of trademark law.4 3
Under a strict interpretation of the universality principle and
trade identity theory, parallel imports cannot cause this type of con-
fusion. A physically genuine good, by definition, is not a copy or
imitation and cannot mislead as to source or supplier.44 This argu-
ment was a fixture of trademark law for many years. One of the earli-
est cases to express this view is Appolinaris Co. v. Scherer,45 decided by
the Supreme Court in 1886. At that time, trademarks operated ex-
37 Id.
38 Id. In a footnote, the court noted that NEC-USA might also have a claim under the
Tariff Act. Section 526 of the Tariff Act and the corresponding Customs regulations are
currently at issue before the Supreme Court. Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Ameri-
can Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating the regulations),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986). The court believed that a Supreme Court ruling in
COPIAT would have no effect on this case. If the Customs regulations are upheld, the Abco
court's decision is consonant; if the regulations are overturned, Abco just simply requires
plaintiffs to proceed under Tariff Act claims. However, both cases involve interpretation
of Katzel. If the Supreme Court chooses to clarify Katzel, it may affect Abco.
39 Important recent cases include: Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada
Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,
806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986); Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D.
Conn. 1987); Ballet Makers, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 633 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Weil Ceramics &
Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985); Diamond Supply Co. v. Prudential
Paper Prods. Co., 589 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
By no means are section 32 and 43 claims the only potential avenues for litigation.
Others include claims under section 42 of the Lanham Act, section 526 of the Tariff Act,
copyright claims, contract claims, state laws, and federal regulations. Seidel, Common Law
Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, and Lanham Act Section 43(a): Can Gray Market
Products Bearing Unregistered Trademarks Be Excluded From Importation?, in GRAY MARKETS AND
PARALLEL IMPORTATION: PROTECTIONISM VS. FREE TRADE 51 (1986).
40 El Greco Leather Prods., 599 F. Supp. at 1390. See also Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d at 74
(Cardamone, J., concurring) ("the essential element of an action under § 32 of the Lan-
ham Act... is a showing of the likelihood of consumer confusion as to source of origin").
41 Donohue, supra note 2, at 188-89.
42 El Greco Leather Prods., 599 F. Supp. at 1390.
43 See, e.g., NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509; Weil Ceramics, 618
F. Supp. at 705; Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d at 74 (Cardamone, J., concurring).
44 See, e.g., Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th
Cir. 1983); DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 622 n.l (2d Cir. 1980); Dia-
mond Supply Co. v. Prudential Paper Prods. Co., 589 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
45 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
NEC ELECTRONICS V. CAL CIRCUIT ABCO
clusively under common law but the argument was extended to the
Trademark Act of 190546 by the Supreme Court's decision in Fred
Gretsch Manufacturing Co. v. Schoening.47
In 1922, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katze148 threw some doubt on the
validity of this argument. In Katzel, a foreign cosmetics manufacturer
sold the American trademark of a face powder to a domestic com-
pany which then imported the powder, repackaged it, and sold it to
the public under that trademark. Simultaneously, the original manu-
facturer proceeded to sell its powder to middlemen who brought the
product into the United States and sold the goods in their original
packages with the same trademark. 49 The American company sued
for trademark infringement and the Second Circuit, following prior
case law, ruled that the plaintiff had no claim because the goods were
genuine.50 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by justice Holmes,
reversed the lower court holding, concluding that the plaintiff was
entitled to trademark protection. 5 1
The scope of this decision is unclear. A number of courts have
interpreted this decision as creating the principle of territoriality re-
placing universality. 52 The Ninth and Second Circuits as well as
some commentators have maintained that Katzel created a narrow ex-
ception to the universality rule. 53 They argue that the Court spoke
in terms of the equities of the specific fact pattern involved. 54 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not use precedent or statutes to reach its con-
clusion.55  In addition, the Supreme Court consistently tried
thereafter to distinguish cases involving genuine goods.56
For example, in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders57 the Supreme
Court called the Katzel decision a case in which the defendant distrib-
uted goods "of one make under the trademark of another."' 58 In
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 59 the Court held that the French owner of a
46 Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 730 (1905).
47 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
48 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
49 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 690-91.
50 Katzel, 275 F. at 540.
51 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691-92.
52 See, e.g., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 909 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 642 (1986); Dial Corp. v.
Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230, 1238 (D. Conn. 1987); Dial Corp. v. Encina
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951, 954 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F.
Supp. 700, 704 (D.N.J. 1985).
53 See NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th Cir. 1987). See
also Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -
(1986); Gorelick & Little, supra note 7, at 212.
54 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1510; Olympus, 792 F.2d at 321; Gorelick & Little, supra note 7, at
212.
55 Gorelick & Little, supra note 7, at 212.
56 Abco, 810 F.2d at 1509. See also Gorelick & Little, supra note 7, at 212-13.
57 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
58 Id. at 128 (citations omitted).
59 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
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domestic trademark could not prohibit a U.S. firm from buying the
products in Europe and selling them domestically. The repackaged
goods had been clearly labelled to show that the seller was not con-
nected with the French manufacturer. The Court stated that, unlike
a Katzel situation, the new label would enable consumers to detect if
the domestic product was inferior to the foreign product. 60
Promoters of a broad interpretation of Katzel simply argue that a
plain reading of the opinion should be used. The Court had clearly
stated the issue it was deciding: "[t]here is no question that the de-
fendant infringes the plaintiff's rights unless the fact that her boxes
and powder are the genuine product of the French concern gives her
a right to sell them in the present form."15' The Court then held that
the trademark "was sold and could only be sold with the good will of
the business that the plaintiff bought."' 62 Thus trademarks must be
designed to protect plaintiff's investment in the good will of the
business.63 The debate cooled over the subsequent years as fewer
and fewer cases trickled into the courts, 64 but revived again in the
early 1980s. 65
An important example is DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co.66
Unilever, a British corporation, had worldwide distribution rights for
a brand of soap whose trademark was owned by another company.
DEP obtained United States distribution rights from Unilever but
subsequently found another company was selling the product here.
DEP sued but the complaint was dismissed because DEP lacked
standing.67 However, in a footnote the district court expressed as
dictum the opinion that the action could not lay anyway because the
goods were genuine. 68
The Ninth Circuit picked up on this point in Monte Carlo Shirt,
Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Corp. 6 9 In that case, Daewoo produced shirts bear-
ing the Monte Carlo trademark under contract to Monte Carlo Shirt.
60 Cohen, Grey Market Imports and the Internatinal Location of Manufacturing, 11 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 176 (1986).
61 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 691 (1923). See also Donohue, supra note
2, at 187.
62 Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
63 Cohen, supra note 60, at 176.
64 Fitzpatrick & Burnet, supra note 4, at 19.
65 Id. The resurgence of cases mirrored the increase in parallel imports. During the
early 1980s the U.S. dollar enjoyed great strength relative to most major currencies. This
resulted in increasingly favorable price differences between foreign markets and the do-
mestic market.
Sales of grey market goods blossomed to an estimated $5.5-10 billion annually. Ker-
sner & SteinJudicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Grey Market Goods: From
Total Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 251, 251 (1986). Re-
cently, the U.S. dollar has weakened and imports appear to be declining.
66 622 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1980).
67 Id. at 621-22.
68 Id. at 622 n.I.
69 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983).
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When Monte Carlo rejected the shirts because of late delivery,
Daewoo's American subsidiary began selling the goods to retailers at
a discount without Monte Carlo's permission. Monte Carlo sued
under common law trademark infringement but the district court dis-
missed the case. The appellate court affirmed this decision stating
that because the ,goods were "planned and sponsored" by Monte
Carlo, they were genuine and could not confuse buyers as to their
origin.70
Finally, Diamond Supply Co. v. Prudential Paper Prods Co. 71 ex-
tended this line of reasoning to the Lanham Act. There, the defen-
dant manufactured private label note pads for the plaintiff, a
wholesaler of office products. After a breakdown in the contractual
relationship, the plaintiff began purchasing goods from another
manufacturer and told the defendant it did not matter what the de-
fendant did with the private label goods that were in the defendant's
inventory. The defendant sold the goods to other wholesalers, and
plaintiff sued under section 43 of the Lanham Act. 7 2 The court
stated, "the essence of the . . .claim is whether there is any likeli-
hood that the public will be misled or confused .... In the instant
case, however, there is no possibility of confusion because the goods
sold are not distinct but deceptively similar goods; rather they are
genuine Diamond goods."' 73 The court cited both Interstate Cigar and
Monte Carlo Shirt as support.
In NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit Abco, the Ninth Circuit used Inter-
state Cigar, Monte Carlo Shirt, and Diamond Supply as supporting prece-
dent for its position on the universality principle and the trade
identity theory. 74 It is not clear that the Second Circuit, where Inter-
state Cigar and Diamond Supply were decided, would go quite so far.
In El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc. 75 the Second Cir-
cuit gave "source of origin" a more expansive definition. The plain-
tiff, a United States marketer of shoes, contracted to have its product
manufactured in Brazil and stamped with the company trademark.
At all times the plaintiff tried to maintain control over the quality of
the product. When problems arose the plaintiff cancelled the order
and the Brazilian company sold the trademarked product to the de-
70 Id. at 1058.
71 589 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
72 Diamond Supply Co. v. Prudential Paper Prods. Co., 589 F. Supp. 470, 471-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73 Id. at 475.
74 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987). One com-
mentator has suggested that viewing Monte Carlo Shirt as standing for the principle that
"genuine goods cannot confuse" is too much of a broad brush interpretation. Proudfoot,
Commonlaw Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution and Lanham Act Section 43(a), in GRAY
MARKETS AND PARALLEL IMPORTATION: PROTECTIONISM VS. FREE TRADE 43 (1986).
75 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986).
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fendant American shoe retailer without the plaintiff's permission. 76
The plaintiff sued for trademark infringement but the defendant
claimed that genuine goods could not confuse and cited Interstate Ci-
gar and Monte Carlo Shirt.7 7 The district court ruled for the defendant
but the appellate court reversed. The court stated, "one of the most
valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act is
the right to control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold
under the holder's trademark." 78 The court went on to chide the
district court for "an unjustifiably narrow view of the protection af-
forded trademark holders by the Lanham Act." 79
In an opinion handed down six weeks after Abco, Original Appa-
lachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs. Inc.,80 the Second Circuit af-
firmed a permanent injunction against an importer of dolls. The
dolls were manufactured in Spain under license from a domestic toy
company for sale in a specific foreign territory. The major difference
between the foreign and domestic dolls was the use of Spanish word-
ing on much of the packaging and certain instruction materials. 8'
The plaintiff argued that this created substantial confusion as to the
source of the product.
The defendant cited several cases including Interstate Cigar and
Monte Carlo Shirt as controlling principle. There could be no confu-
sion as to the source of origin because the defendant's product bears
a genuine trademark licensed by the plaintiff.8 2
The court was not persuaded. "The present case is distinguish-
able from the above cases because ... [t]here is a very real difference
in the product itself .... It is this difference that creates the confu-
sion over the source of the product and results in a loss of OAA's...
good will."8' 3 These rulings indicate that the Second Circuit still
supports the universality principle but not the trade identity theory.
It is difficult to tell, though, whether the Second Circuit would find
the lack of warranties and service support for NEC chips a quality
difference that creates confusion over the source of the product.
As stated earlier, all courts agree that confusion over the source
of origin is protected by trademark law. The Ninth Circuit uses a
strict literal interpretation of "source of origin." The Second Circuit
7r, El Greco Leather Prods., 806 F.2d at 393-94 (2d Cir. 1986).
77 Id. at 395.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987). This was one often similar federal lawsuits brought by
the plaintiff throughout the United States. See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986), Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. May Dep't Stores, 640 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. 11. 1986).
81 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 70 (2d
Cir. 1987).
82 Id. at 72.
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believes "source of origin" includes the right to control quality. But
some courts have found sources of confusion significantly beyond
those implied by the source of origin concept.8 4
The arguments for this position are summarized by Weil Ceramics
& Glass, Inc. v. Dash.8 5 In Weil, a domestic porcelain importer that
shared a commoi corporate parent with the foreign manufacturer
from which it bought goods, sued another importer who purchased
the same goods overseas from a middleman. 86 The defendant ar-
gued that because the goods were genuine, there could not be confu-
sion. The court disagreed, citing Katzel and the territoriality
principle.8 7 The court further pointed out that the deletion of the
"source of origin" requirement from section 32 of the Lanham Act
made it clear that any form of confusion regarding the trademark
affecting the company standing behind that mark is actionable.88
Thus, the court reasoned that if there was confusion as to some in-
tangible aspect of the product such as quality or serviceability, even a
genuine good could interfere with a trademark.8 9
There are at least two cases in which the Weil precedent was fol-
lowed and a third in which it was implicitly approved. In Dial Corp. v.
Encina Corp.,90 Dial, a United States soap manufacturer, filed claims
under sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act against a company
which imported foreign manufactured soap with an identical trade-
mark. Dial asserted that the foreign soap maker was licensed by the
domestic manufacturer to use the trademark, Dial, on a product that
was intended to only be sold in a specific foreign territory. The for-
eign soap had a different chemical makeup, fragrance, and size. It
also was not marked according to FDA regulations.9' The defendant
argued that a domestic company that licenses the manufacture of its
product and the use of its trademark overseas cannot prevent impor-
tation and sale of that product in the United States.92 On a motion
to dismiss, the court ruled in favor of Dial stating, "[t]he territoriality
principle has continued to form the doctrinal framework for sus-
taining claims . .. .,93 and cited Weil.94
The same fact pattern arose in Dial Corp. v. Manghnani Inv.
84 See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985). See
also Dial Corp. y. Manghnani Inv. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987); Dial Corp. v.
Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
85 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
86 Id. at 702-03.
87 Id, at 704-06.
88 Id. at 706.
81) Id.
90 643 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
91 Id. at 952.
92 Id. at 954.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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Corp.95 On a motion for partial summary judgment, the court found
that the issue was whether there was "any likelihood that an appreci-
able number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled
or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in ques-
tion." 96 The court believed that, among other things, the quality of
the defendant's product and the sophistication of the buyers, were
determinative factors. 97 The court explicitly disagreed with the de-
fendant's contention that genuine goods cannot create confusion
and cited Weil.98
Finally, in Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs. Inc.,
a concurring opinion was written which implicitly endorsed the Weil
perspective. The opinion agreed that trademarks identify source of
origin, but asserted that the court should go further, stating, "[m]any
commentators however recognize that trademark law also serves to
guarantee the quality of the trademarked product." 99
This is what NEC argued before the Ninth Circuit.' 00 NEC did
not deny that the physical goods were identical from the two distrib-
utors.' 0 ' Rather the quality of product servicing led to actionable
confusion.' 0 2 Thus, NEC-USA would have overcome the likelihood
of confusion hurdle under the Weil analysis.
But even when the territoriality principle is applied to parallel
imports, authorized distributors are not guaranteed a victory. If
.there is confusion over some other aspect of the product, there is
still a question whether the plaintiff has depleted its rights of en-
forcement under the exhaustion doctrine.' 0 3 This issue has only
been addressed a few times.' 0 4 Parallel importers argue that the ex-
haustion doctrine "seem[s] to suggest that once the original mark
owner had lost control of the marked goods by releasing them into
commerce, his assignee in a foreign country could not logically own
rights superior to those of the assignor. The right of control seems
exhausted."' 0 5 That is, there can be no confusion where identical
good will has been passed on by the original foreign producer
through both channels of distribution.
Courts seem to agree that "the exhaustion doctrine does not ap-
9.5 659 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Conn. 1987).
943 Id. at 1236.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1238.
91) Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 74 (2d
Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
10o NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987).
10o Id. at 1508.
102 Id.
103 Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d at 76 (CardamoneJ., concurring).
104 Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 707 (D.N.J. 1985).
105 Id. at 711-12.
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ply to genuine goods which have been altered." 06 Even with unal-
tered goods, one opinion is that the exhaustion doctrine does not
apply in the international context.10 7 Another opinion is that "the
exhaustion doctrine applies when, the United States mark holder is
related to the foreign mark holder and/or manufacturer."' 08 How-
ever, if the plaintiff shows that although it has legal ties to the parent
corporation, it has developed independent good will in the trade-
mark, the exhaustion doctrine will not apply.' 0 9 Proof of indepen-
dent good will has included selection of retail outlets, inspection or
quality control over products,"10 warranty service, rebates, educa-
tional activities, and advertising."'
The Abco court mentioned the exhaustion doctrine as a control-
ling principle in the case, .12 but did not develop the argument fur-
ther. With the conflicting rulings in this area, it is not clear whether
NEC-USA developed enough independent good will to satisfy the
exhaustion doctrine.
The key public policy issue underlying the grey market is protec-
tionism versus free trade. The universality principle promotes free
trade by all suppliers of a brand at the expense of incentive to the
mark holder to develop the mark in the first place.' 13 The territorial-
ity principle is protectionist in that it promotes and protects the mark
holder's good will against lower-overhead, foreign suppliers. 114
This encourages the mark holder to develop brand recognition of its
differentiated products, but may also permit price discrimination be-
tween geographic markets.'15
Neither absolute universality nor absolute territoriality is desire-
able or prescribed by case law. Universality recognizes the Katzel ex-
ception that gives territorial control to independent local mark
holders. Territoriality requires mark holders to develop independent
good will to earn protection of the mark. The question is what for-
mulation of these rules will create an appropriate legal and economic
policy somewhere between absolute free trade and absolute
protectionism.
The different approaches under sections 32 and 43 of the Lan-
ham Act, although potentially reconcilable, have started to move in
Io6 Granada Elecs., 816 F.2d at 76 (Cardamone, J. concurring).
107 Id.
1o8 Weil Ceramics, at 711-12.
109 Id.
it) Id.
III Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
112 NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987).
I 13 Kelly, An Overview of Grey Market Goods Into the United States, I I NC.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG 231, 231-32 (1986).
114 See Cohen, supra note 60, at 179.
11' Kelly, supra note 113, at 231.
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seriously divergent directions. This is making a coherent policy
more difficult to achieve than ever.
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